The characteristics of the distribution of security returns, such as skewness, play a significant role in financial theory and practice. This paper examines whether conditional skewness of daily aggregate market returns is predictable and investigates the economic mechanisms underlying this predictability. In both developed and emerging markets, there is strong evidence that lagged returns predict skewness; returns are more negatively skewed following an increase in stock prices and returns are more positively skewed following a decrease in stock prices. The empirical evidence shows that the traditional explanations such as the l everage effect, the volatility feedback effect, the stock bubble model (Blanchard and Watson, 1982), and the fluctuating uncertainty theory (Veronesi, 1999) are not driving the predictability of conditional skewness at the market level. The relation between skewness and lagged returns is most consistent with the Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) model. There is some weak evidence that in developed countries, high trend-adjusted turnover predicts more negative skewness in returns. We examine if short-sale constraints play a role in the relation between lagged trend-adjusted turnover and skewness as posit by Hong and Stein (2003) . We find evidence contrary to the Hong and Stein (2003) model. Our findings have implications for future theoretical and empirical models of time-varying market returns.
Introduction
The characteristics of the distribution of security returns, such as skewness, play a significant role in financial theory and practice. Patton (2002) shows that accounting for skewness improves performance of optimal asset allocation. In an empirical study of stock portfolio returns, Harvey and Siddique (2000a) find that coskewness of portfolio returns with the aggregate market returns is a determinant of expected returns. 1 Furthermore, accurate prediction of the conditional return distribution, especially at the higher moments (volatility and skewness), significantly improves the valuation of contingent claims and the accuracy and effectiveness of risk management. Thus, investigating asymmetry in stock return distribution and understanding the economic forces underlying it is important.
There is ample evidence that the unconditional distributions of individual stock returns and the aggregate market returns are asymmetric. 2 Recently, however, a few empirical studies report evidence that the conditional skewness of individual stock returns is predictable. Harvey and Siddique (2000a) document that skewness varies among portfolios of different size and book-to-market levels. Chen, Hong, and, Stein (2001) test the predictability of skewness in daily returns of individual stocks in the U.S. stock market. They find that negative conditional skewness is most pronounced in stocks that have experienced increase in trend-adjusted turnover, and (2) have had positive cumulative returns over the prior 36 months. 3 At the market level, some empirical studies document evidence that skewness is time varying, but they do not test if skewness is predictable. Harvey and Siddique (1999) document time variation in the skewness of the S&P500 index returns and four other 1 Harvey and Siddique (2000a) define coskewness as a measure of the comovement of the second moments of the portfolio returns and the second moment of aggregate market returns. 2 For example, historical U.S. market returns have more extreme negative returns than positive returns. Some empirical studies show that a non-symmetric t -distribution fits stock return better. A substantial body of literature documents asymmetric volatility (higher volatility when stocks prices are down than when they are up), which has a close relation with negative skewness (See for example, Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) , Lebaron (1992) , and Glosten, Jagannathan, Runkle (1993) ). Lastly, after October 1987, the implied volatility of out-of-the-many puts greatly exceeds the implied volatility of the out-of-the-money calls reflecting a negative asymmetry in returns (Bates, 1997 , Bakshi, et al., 1997 , Dumas et al., 1998 . 3 Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) also test the predictability of U.S. index returns. They find a negative but insignificant relation between lagged trend-adjusted turnover and skewness, and find a significant negative relation between lagged returns and skewness. international market returns. They estimate an autoregressive conditional skewness model. In their model, skewness is a function of lagged skewness, but not of lagged returns or other exogenous variables. 4 This paper examines whether the conditional skewness of aggregate market returns is predictable and investigates what economic mechanisms are responsible for the predictability of conditional skewness of aggregate market returns.
Why should conditional skewness be predictable? A number of theories address this question. The earliest hypothesis focusing on this question is the leverage effect (Black 1976; Christie, 1982) . A drop in stock price raises financial and operating leverage, which increases volatility of subsequent stock returns. An increase in stock price reduces leverage, which reduces volatility of subsequent stock returns. Because leverage increases following a price decline (when debt is constant), the return distribution of stocks become more (less) negatively skewed after a period of stock price decline (rises). Second is the volatility feedback effect (Pindyck, 1984; French el al., 1987; and Campbell and Hentschel, 1992) .
Releases of major bad news decrease stock price and increase volatility. The increase in volatility increases expected returns, which exacerbates the stock price decline. On the other hand, releases of major good news increase stock price and also increase volatility; the second effect dampens the former. Thus, the volatility feedback effect may cause the conditional return distribution to be more negatively skewed after a stock price decline.
Third is the stochastic bubble model of Blanchard and Watson (1982) . The asymmetry in the bubble model is due to a burst of a stock bubble -a low probability of very large negative returns. In this case, negative skewness follows the end of a period of sustained stock price increase.
The fourth theory is one of fluctuation in the level of uncertainty (David, 1997; Veronesi, 1999) . Veronesi (1999) models the dividend process as a Markov switching process between two states: good and bad economic states. When investors receive a stream of good news, they become more certain that the economy is in the good state. If bad news arrives following a stream of good news, it causes a price decline and also makes investors more uncertain as to what state the economy is in. On the other hand, the arrival of good news when investors believe that the economy is in the bad state, increases price, but it also increases the uncertainty about what state the economy is in. Veronesi shows that in equilibrium, the willingness of investors to hedge against a change in their own uncertainty on the true state of the economy makes stock price overreact to bad news and underreact to good news. In this model, stock returns are negatively skewed even when news is ex ante symmetric.
The last two theories are from two recently proposed models based on heterogeneous beliefs of investors interacting with market frictions that result in distinctive predictions on conditional skewness and volatility. In Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) (hereafter CCH), symmetric trading costs blocks some informed investors from trading, keeping them on the sideline. When these sidelined investors observe trades that increase the accuracy and value of their private information to the level that exceeds trading costs, they enter the market in burst causing time variation in conditional skewness. CCH predict negative skewness in returns following a price run up and positive skewness following a price run down. CCH also predict increase in volatility following large price changes. Hong and Stein (2003) (hereafter HS) proposed a model based on heterogeneous beliefs interacting with short-sale constraints. Their model predicts that when short sales are restricted, negative skewness will be more pronounced following high trend-adjusted turnover, which proxies for high level of heterogeneous beliefs. Both these models are reviewed in detail in the next section.
This study contributes to the literature on stock return distributions in two dimensions. It presents new evidence that conditional skewness of aggregate market returns is predictable and develops tests that discriminates among different mechanisms that can lead to predictable conditional skewness. We analyze aggregate market returns in 57 countries and find that lagged one-month returns predict conditional skewness of daily returns during the following month.
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This relation between skewness and lagged return is economically and statistically strong across both developed and emerging countries.
To assess the descriptive power of the prior theories, we examine the relation between lagged returns and conditional skewness and conditional volatility separately for lagged 5 We find similar results using lagged returns over 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months. positive returns and lagged negative returns. Existing empirical studies of the relation between skewness and lagged returns in individual stocks do not distinguish whether this relation is symmetric with respect to the direction of lagged returns. Like several prior studies, we find that higher conditional volatility follows large price change in the previous period. The volatility increase is higher following a price decline than a price increase. These results are consistent with the leverage effect, the volatility feedback effect, and the fluctuation uncertainty theory.
However, we also document that stock returns become more negatively skewed following a positive return month and become more positively skewed following a negative return month. The relation between lagged return and skewness is slightly stronger for negative lagged returns. This empirical evidence on skewness, particularly the result that negative lagged returns predict more positive skewness, is contrary to the predictions of the three previously mentioned theories. Furthermore, the stochastic stock bubble model is inconsistent with positive skewness following a stock price run down. Together our empirical evidence suggests that there are other economic mechanisms driving the relation between lagged returns and skewness that subsume the effect of these well-known theories.
The economic mechanism proposed in CCH appears to be the most consistent with our findings on conditional skewness.
With respect to the relation between lagged trend-adjusted turnover and skewness, we find some weak statistical evidence that returns of developed markets are more negatively skewed following high trend-adjusted turnover. We further examine the prediction of Hong and Stein (2003) by interacting lagged trend-adjusted turnover with a variable that measures the existence of short selling in each country. We find that in markets where short selling is possible, the stock market returns are more negatively skewed following an increase in trendadjusted turnover than in markets where short selling is not possible. This result contradicts Hong and Stein (2003) model, which predict the opposite.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides theoretical background on the models of Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) and Hong and Stein (2003) .
Section II describes the data used in our analysis. Section III reports empirical test evidence.
Section IV discusses the robustness of our results. Section V provides remarks on our findings and conclusions.
I. Background theories
A. Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) In the Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) model there are informed investors, uninformed, noise traders, and an uninformed market maker. All market participants are fully rational.
Investors incur heterogeneous trading costs. There is a probability that a set of investors received a common informative but noisy signal about the valuation of a security.
The following chain of events illustrates the main idea of this model. There is private good news about a security, and a set of investors receive a favorable signal about this security.
Despite receiving a private signal, some investors are "sidelined" and do not trade because of high trading costs. Others with lower trading costs buy the security. After observing a stock price increase due to the buy trades, a favorably informed sidelined investor weighs two effects. On the one hand, the accuracy of his signal is confirmed, but on the other hand the stock price is more expensive to buy. The price increase may not outweigh the net gain from trading because the price is revised by the uninformed market maker. The revised price set by the market maker remains less than the full information price because the market maker does not know for certain if there is a private signal, she only assigns a probability to the possibility that there is a private signal. Therefore, the market maker, places a higher probability that the last trade was from a liquidity trader whereas the informed sidelined investor, having received a signal himself, concludes that the previous trade is more likely to be from another informed trader rather than a liquidity trader. Thus, more informed investors, who were previously side lined, buy stocks because the confirmation of their signal by other buyers outweighs their trading costs. This is how a significant price rise can trigger trading of a favorable informed investor previously sidelined. On the contrary, an adversely informed investor becomes less confident that he has received the correct signal, and therefore sits out and does not trade.
This sidelining of investors causes conditional changes in skewness as a function of past returns. After an upward price trend, it is likely that there are a few sidelined investors with favorable signals in which case price will rise moderately higher. It is, however, likely that there are a large number of sidelined investors with adverse signals. The eventual entry of sidelines investors with adverse signals will cause a major correction. Thus, returns become more negatively skewed following price rises, even when returns are ex ante symmetric. The opposite chain of events occurs when private news is negative. In this case, prices decline and sidelined investors are more likely to be the ones that have favorable signals. Thus, returns are more positively skewed following a price decline. This mechanism also gives rise to high conditional volatility following either a large price increase or decline.
A. Hong and Stein (2003) Hong and Stein (2003) This assumption keeps the differences of opinion between the two investors from converging. Arbitrageurs are fully rational, risk-neutral, and uninformed. Arbitrageurs realized that the best estimate of the stock value is the average of signals of A and B.
Sometimes, however, the arbitrageurs do not observe the signal of A or B because A or B may not trade due to short-sale constraints.
To see how the model generates asymmetric conditional skewness, consider an example.
There are two trade dates in the model. At time 1, let investor A receive a pessimistic signal such that A's valuation is lower than that of B. The trade at time 1 will be a trade between B and the arbitrageurs. Investor A sits out of the market since he is not allowed to short sale.
Arbitrageurs observe this and realize that A's valuation is lower than that of B, but do not know by how much. Thus, the stock price at time 1 does not fully reflect information of A.
At date 2, if B's signal is positive then B trades with the arbitrageurs, and A does not trade.
The stock price still does not reflect A's time 1 information. If, however, at time 2 B receives a pessimistic signal that is lower than the current market valuation, then B will sell his stocks which lowers price. At this point arbitrageurs learn something by observing if and at what price A steps in and starts buying. That is, arbitrageurs learn about A's information by observing how A reacts to reduced demand by B. Thus, more information of pessimistic investors is revealed as stock price declines. This mechanic generates a higher variance as the stock price declines causing negative skewness in stock returns at time 2.
The logic above, however, is not sufficient to establish that the return distribution over time 1 and time 2 is negatively skewed. There is a counter effect of positive skewness at time 1 because the negative draws are the ones hidden from the market at time 1. Hong and Stein (2003) show that when A's and B's beliefs are sufficiently close, the positive skewness at time 1 can dominate. However, when the initially beliefs of A and B are sufficiently different, time-2 effect dominates leading to negative skewness in returns. Hong and Stein (2003) suggest that the level divergence of opinion can be measured by turnover. Thus, they predict that returns will be more negatively skewed following an incrase in turnover. 
II. Data

A. Market return variables
The conditional skewness in daily returns, t i sk , ,is computed each month as:
where
is the index return of country i on day τ in month t, t i r , is the average daily return for returns of month t, and n is the number of daily observations in month t. Scaling the raw central third moment by the standard deviation is a standard normalization employed for skewness statistics that allows for comparison across returns with different variances (Green, 1993) .
The conditional volatility of daily market returns is the standard deviation of daily returns in a month given as
We also examine the volatility of monthly returns estimated using the following ARCH model: 
r w, t is the monthly return of the world market index at month t.
, it ε is the innovation in monthly return of the stock market index of country i at month t. h w, t is the conditional variance of the world index at time t. h i,t, is the conditional variance of the monthly return of the stock market index of country i at month t. The conditional volatility of monthly returns is the square root of h i,t .
h i,w, t is the conditional covariance of the monthly returns of the stock market index of country i with the monthly return of the world index at time t.
The weights of the lagged residual vectors of the model in (3) are taken to be 1/2, 1/3, and 1/6, as in as in Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987) . The constants a 2 , b 2 , and c 2 are constrained to be identical for every country-world pair. We use the Morgan Stanley Capital International Inc. (MSCI) value-weighted world index as proxy for the world market portfolio. 6 We estimate the model in (3) using the maximum likelihood estimate.
Turnover is defined as the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month. To mitigate the effect of outliers, which occur because the denominator is small in some countries, we take the natural logarithm of this ratio. As in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), we use trend-adjusted turnover to test the predictions of Hong and S tein (2003) . The adjustment eliminates any component of turnover that is related to a fixed country characteristic. Here, the adjustment is done by subtracting from turnover the average of turnover during the previous six months. 7 
B. Data on the legality and existence of short selling and existence of put options
We construct a measure of short-sale constraints using survey data on the existence of short selling and put option trading from Charoenrook and Daouk (2003) . Charoenrook and Daouk (2003) report survey data on legality and practice of short selling and practice of put option trading of 111 countries. We use practice rather than legality of short selling because, as reported in Charoenrook and Daouk (2003) , some countries do not have rules prohibiting short selling and at the same time no short selling takes place because of lack of institutional facilities. On the other hand, some countries prohibit short selling, but short selling routinely takes place via off-shore markets.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 reports the existence of short selling and put option trading in each of the 57 countries in our sample data. The measure of short-sale constraints variable SSPO existence equals 1 if either short selling or put options trading exist in practice, and it 6 The MSCI World Index is actually an index of only developed countries. It begins in December 1969. In principal, the choice of MSCI All-Country World Index, which includes more countries, may be better. In practice, however, since the MSCI All-Country World Index is available only from December 1987, and because it has a correlation of 0.9968 with the MSCI World Index, MSCI World Index is a better choice. 7 Our results are not sensitive to how we adjust for the trend. We adjust turnover using the average turnover over a 6 month period, 12 month period, and 18 month period and find the same results. equals 0 otherwise. For example, Chile started put option trading in 1994 and short selling in 2001, thus the variable SSPO existence for Chile equals 1 in January 1995 and thereafter.
[Insert Table I here]
C. Control Variables
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) empirically show that liberalization has an effect on liquidity and volatility. We control for the confounding effects of liberalization in all our tests. The indicator variable "liberalization" in Bekaert and Harvey (2000), and
Henry (2000) changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization. Official liberalization dates used here are obtained from Table I in Bekaert and Harvey (2000) for countries reported, and the rest from Henry (2000) .
In addition to liberalization, in regression specifications of tests of conditional volatility we include lagged volatility to control for autocorrelation in volatility. Chen Hong, and Stein (2001) find that both lagged detrended turnover and lagged return predict conditional skewness of individual stock returns, therefore we include both in our regression specifications.
III. Empirical evidence
We are interested in examining the patterns of conditional skewness in the aggregate market returns of the U.S and other international markets and finding out what economic mechanisms drive these patterns. We examine both time series regressions of individual counties and pooled cross-section and time series panel regressions. All the regressions are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. All panel regressions include a country-fixed-effect dummy (not reported).
A. Predictability of conditional skewness: individual countries
Columns 3 and 4 of Table I reports the unconditional skewness and unconditional volatility of daily returns for each country. The unconditional skewness and volatility are computed as in Equation (1) and Equation (2), except that each country's sample data is employed to calculate a single skewness or volatility estimate rather than monthly estimates. Like previous studies, we find that the skewness of the U.S market portfolio is negative. Negative skewness is common in developed markets; eighteen out of twenty three developed markets have negative skewness. This is not the case in emerging markets; only fourteen out of thirty four emerging markets exhibit negative skewness. With respect to volatility, emerging markets appear to have higher volatility than developed markets.
Columns 5 through 7 of Table 1 report individual market regression coefficients of conditional skewness on lagged trend-adjusted turnover and lagged return, controlling for liberalization (not reported). The coefficients that are significant at approximately 10% or lower are highlighted. The coefficient of lagged trend-adjusted turnover is significant at the 10% level for 3 developed markets. They are negative for Germany and Spain and positive for Sweden. The coefficients of lagged trend-adjusted turnover are significant at the 10% level for 9 emerging markets; six coefficients are negative and three are positive. These results indicate that the relation between skewness and lagged trend-adjusted turnover, when they exist, are more frequently negative.
In the regression of conditional skewness on lagged trend-adjusted turnover and lagged return, the coefficients of lagged returns are significant at the 10% level for 7 developed markets and 7 emerging markets. The coefficients in all seven developed markets are negative and the coefficients of six of the seven emerging markets are negative. Columns 8 and 9 report the regression coefficients of conditional skewness on lagged returns controlling for liberalization. The coefficients of lagged returns of 8 developed markets and 7 emerging markets are significant at the 10% level. All the significant coefficients are
negative. There appears to be a negative relation between skewness and lagged returns.
B. Predictability of conditional skewness: Panel regression analysis
We test for the predictability of skewness using panel regressions. The summary statistics for the variables employed in the panel regressions are presented in Table II. [Insert Table II here] Table III reports regressions of conditional skewness on lagged trend-adjusted turnover and lagged one-month returns, controlling for liberalization and fixed-country effects. Lagged trend-adjusted turnover is weakly related to skewness in developed markets, but not in emerging markets. The regression coefficient of lagged trend-adjusted turnover varies between -0.8 and -1.0 in developed countries. The coefficients are significant at the 20% level in regression specifications 1 and 3, and at the 9% level in regression specification 4.
[Insert Table III here] Lagged return is negatively related to conditional skewness. Lagged return is a very strong predictor of skewness of market returns in both developed countries and in emerging countries. The slope estimates for lagged returns are between -0.66 to -0.52 in all equation specifications and country groupings. All coefficients are statistically significant at lower than the 1% level. The relation of lagged return and skewness is also economically significant. From regression (3), a one standard deviation change in lagged return predicts a 0.64 change in skewness of returns, which equals 85% of the standard deviation in the dispersion of conditional skewness in our sample (0.79 in Table 2 ).
C. Conditional skewness and lagged returns
The negative relation between skewness and lagged returns is not consistent with the leverage effect, however, it is consistent with other theories presented above. For example, the stochastic bubble theory predicts negative skewness following positive returns, and CCH predicts negative skewness following a price run up and positive skewness following a price run down. Next we attempt to untangle these theories by testing the relation of skewness and lagged returns separately for positive lagged returns and negative lagged returns.
[Insert Table IV here] We sort the sample data by lagged returns into deciles of equal observations. We use the daily returns in each decile to compute one skewness estimate and the standard error for the estimate. The skewness is computed using Equation (1). The corresponding standard error is
, where n is the number of observations. The conditional skewness estimates that are [Insert Table VI 
D. Conditional volatility and lagged returns
Since the leverage effect, the volatility feedback effect, the fluctuation uncertainty, and the Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) model, also have implications on conditional volatility, we next examine the relation of conditional volatility and lagged absolute returns. We examine both the volatility of daily returns and volatility of monthly returns from the ARCH model described in Section II. We divide the sample into those that include lagged positive return only and lagged negative returns only, and test for the relation of lagged absolute returns and volatility. The results in Panels B and C of Table VII show higher volatility follows higher lagged returns when lagged returns are negative and when lagged returns are positive. This result is consistent with the volatility feedback effect, the fluctuation uncertainty model, and the CCH model.
We further examine if the regression coefficients of lagged absolute return is higher when lagged returns are negative. The t-statistics corresponding to the test of this hypothesis is reported in italics in Panel C of Table VII. They are significant at the 5% level in all cases except for monthly volatility of emerging markets. Thus, volatility increases more following a stock price decline than a stock price increase, which is consistent with the leverage effect.
E. Conditional skewness and lagged detrended turnover
In the Hong and Stein (2003) 
IV. Robustness
In this section, we review two issues related to our empirical analysis: the robustness of the results given different specifications of lagged returns and trend-adjusted turnover and noise in the skewness estimates. Table IX reports regressions of skewness on lagged returns and trend-adjusted turnover for different specifications of lagged returns and trend-adjusted turnover. Tests using l agged returns constructed using the previous 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months are reported. Trend-adjusted turnover is constructed by subtracting the trend over the previous 6 months, 18 months, and 30 months. The results in all regression specifications are qualitatively the same as our main results.
The skewness variable is estimated each month from daily returns, thus it is measured with noise. In the case that the measurement error is correlated with a regressor, then the point estimate of the regression coefficient on that regressor is positively biases if the measurement error is positively correlated with the regressor. The regression coefficient is negatively biased if the measurement error is negatively correlated with the regressor.
To asses whether our measurement error is related to lagged return, we sort monthly skewness estimates by their corresponding lagged returns into 10 deciles, and then calculate the standard deviation of monthly skewness in each decile. We then examine if there is any detectable relation between the standard deviation number and the average lagged return among the deciles. Table X reports the standard deviation and average lagged returns for the 10 groupings of monthly skewness for the sample that includes all markets, and for emerging and developed markets separately. The results show that there is no relation between the standard deviation of monthly skewness estimates and lagged returns, thus assuring that the regression coefficients in our analysis are unbiased.
In the case that the measurement error is independent of the regressors in the regression analysis, then the point estimates of the regression coefficients are unbiased but the standard error estimates are inflated. In this case, the regression is tilted against finding significance.
We find strong statistical significance that lagged return predicts skewness despite estimation error.
V. Conclusions
This paper examines whether conditional skewness of aggregate market returns are predictable. We find a strong negative relation between conditional skewness and lagged returns. We also find weak evidence that lagged trend-adjusted turnover predicts skewness.
Trend-adjusted turnover predicts negative skewness in developed countries, but not in emerging countries. To assess the empirical validity of these theories, we examine the relation of lagged returns and skewness separately for lagged positive returns and lagged negative returns. We find that stock returns become more negatively skewed following a positive return month and become more positively skewed following a negative return month. The relation between lagged returns and skewness is slightly stronger for negative lagged returns. We also find that higher volatility follows a large price change in either direction. The increase in volatility is higher following a stock price decline than following a price increase.
Our volatility findings are c onsistent with the leverage, the volatility feedback, and fluctuation uncertainty effects. In particular, the leverage effect and the volatility feedback effect are so closely tied to fundamental finance theories that it would be surprising if we did not find it in the data. On the other hand, out findings concerning conditional skewness appear to contradict these theories. Our findings indicate that there are stronger economic mechanisms which drive the predictability of conditional skewness of aggregate market returns, while economically dominate the leverage effect and the volatility feedback effect.
The economic mechanism proposed in CCH appears to be the most consistent with all our empirical findings, especially with our findings on conditional skewness.
To test the Hong and Stein (2003) model we also include a short-sale constraint indicator in our tests. We find that in markets where short selling is possible, the stock market returns are more negatively skewed following an increase in trend-adjusted turnover, than in markets where short selling is not possible. This appears contrary to the prediction by Hong and Stein (2003) .
Our paper has a number of implications f or future research. First, since skewness of aggregate market returns are predictable, future econometric modeling of aggregate market returns should be flexible enough to allow conditional skewness to be affected by lagged returns and other variables such as turnover. Second, future theories of the stock return generating process should account for the predictability of conditional skewness at a marketwide level. In particular, future theories should account for both negative skewness following price increases, as well as positive skewness following price declines. This pattern in conditional skewness is at variance with the predictions of two well known theories; the leverage effect and the volatility feedback effect. (1) using daily market returns for each month. Turnover is the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month. Detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous six months. SSPO existence is a binary variable that equals one if either short-selling or put option trading is possible in that country during that month (in practice). The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . Volatility is the standard deviation of daily return during a month. This table reports panel regressions of conditional skewness of daily returns on lagged detrended turnover, lagged one-month returns, controlling for lagged skewness, lagged volatility, liberalization, and a country-fixed-effect dummy (not reported). Turnover is the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month. Detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. Lagged skewness is the skewness during the previous month. Lagged volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns during the previous month. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . All regression coefficient estimates are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in parenthesis.
All countries Developed countries Emerging countries
Regression specification We sort the sample data based on lagged returns into deciles of equal observations. We use the daily returns in each decile to compute a skewness estimate and the standard error for each estimate. The skewness is computed using Equation (1). The corresponding standard error = n / 6
, where n is the number of observations. The conditional skewness estimate that is more than twice the conditional skewness estimate is highlighted in bold. This table reports panel regressions of conditional skewness of daily returns on SSPO existence, lagged detrended turnover, lagged one-month returns, the interaction term SSPO existence x detrended turnover, controlling for liberalization, and a country-fixed-effect dummy (not reported). The data set employed includes only data points when lagged returns are positive. SSPO existence is a measure of short-sale constraints. SSPO existence is a binary variable that equals one if either short-selling or put option trading is possible in that country during that month (in practice). Turnover is the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month. Detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . All regression coefficient estimates are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in parenthesis. Panel A reports the regressions that include all countries. Panel B and C report regressions that include developed and emerging countries. This table reports panel regressions of conditional skewness of daily returns on SSPO existence, lagged detrended turnover, lagged one-month returns, the interaction term SSPO existence x detrended turnover, controlling for liberalization, and a country-fixed-effect dummy (not reported). The data set employed includes only data points when lagged returns are negative. SSPO existence is a measure of short-sale constraints. SSPO existence is a binary variable that equals one if either short-selling or put option trading is possible in that country during that month (in practice). Turnover is the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month. Detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . All regression coefficient estimates are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in parenthesis. Panel A reports the regressions that include all countries. Panel B and C report regressions that include developed and emerging countries. This table reports panel regressions of conditional skewness of daily returns on SSPO existence, lagged detrended turnover, lagged one-month returns, the interaction term SSPO existence x detrended turnover, controlling for liberalization, and a country-fixed-effect dummy (not reported). SSPO existence is a measure of short-sale constraints. SSPO existence is a binary variable that equals one if either short-selling or put option trading is possible in that country during that month (in practice). Turnover is the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month. Detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . All regression coefficient estimates are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in parenthesis. Turnover is the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . The 6 regression specifications differ in how the detrended turnover and lagged return variables were constructed. For regression (1), detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. For regression (2), detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous 3 months. For regression (3), detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous 6 months. For regression (4), detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous 12 months. For regression (5), detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous 18 months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. For regression (6), detrended turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous 30 months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. All regression coefficient estimates are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in parenthesis.
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